Key Takeaways
A procedure can be technically clear and still be difficult to follow when actual staffing, equipment, timing or dependencies differ from its assumptions.
Researchers distinguish work-as-imagined (how work is expected to happen) from work-as-done (how it actually happens); the gap can reveal both hidden risk and useful adaptation.
The managerial question is not whether procedures matter, but whether they describe a feasible, safe operation under the conditions employees actually face.
When a manager discovers that employees routinely work around an official procedure, the first interpretation is often that discipline has weakened. Sometimes that is correct: an important safeguard may be deliberately bypassed. But a second possibility deserves attention. The written process may describe a world that no longer exists—or never existed in quite that form. Understanding the difference is central to organizational reliability.
What is the difference between work-as-imagined and work-as-done?
Work-as-imagined is how a task is represented in plans, policies, training and managerial expectations. Work-as-done is how people carry it out in actual conditions, including interruptions, competing goals and unexpected variation. The distinction is discussed in the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality's overview of Safety-I, Safety-II and newer approaches to safety. These are analytical descriptions, not an assertion that written procedures are inherently inferior to practical experience.
A procedure usually has to simplify. It cannot describe every possible exception or interaction. Simplification is useful: it makes expectations consistent and allows people to coordinate. But it also hides assumptions. A sequence may require equipment to be available, an earlier task to be complete, information to be accurate, or enough time to verify a result. When those assumptions fail, the worker encounters a decision that the document did not fully anticipate.
The UK's Health and Safety Executive defines human factors broadly: task characteristics, individual capabilities and organizational conditions all influence behavior and safety (HSE, Introduction to human factors). This matters because a gap between a procedure and real work is not necessarily a gap in individual knowledge.
Why do sensible procedures become difficult to follow?
One reason is change. A process may have been designed when demand was lower, staffing was different or information moved through fewer systems. The procedure stays stable while the environment changes. Another reason is competing requirements. A worker may be told to verify every exception, respond immediately to customers and meet a fixed deadline. Each instruction can look reasonable separately. Together, they may create an impossible combination.
Consider a hypothetical service team required to obtain a second approval before resolving an unusual customer request. The approval rule exists to reduce errors. Yet if the approver is unavailable during the busiest hours, employees face a choice between delaying service and bypassing the check. Observing the bypass tells us something about behavior; it does not, by itself, tell us whether the solution is stricter enforcement, different availability or redesign. The example is illustrative, not a documented case study.
The HSE's workload guidance explains that human information-processing and decision-making capacity are limited, and that excessive workload can contribute to slower performance and errors. A process that depends on perfect attention during sustained overload may be vulnerable even if every instruction is well written.
Does a workaround always indicate unsafe behavior?
No. A workaround can be a warning sign, a locally useful adaptation, an unacceptable violation, or a mixture of these. The distinction cannot be settled by whether the outcome happened to be successful. Repeatedly getting away with a shortcut does not demonstrate that it is safe. Equally, labeling every deviation as carelessness can obscure a procedure that is impossible to execute as written.
The AHRQ discussion of Safety-II highlights the importance of studying how everyday performance succeeds despite complexity and variability. That does not mean endorsing unsafe improvisation. It means looking at the conditions under which people adapt, including the trade-offs that formal instructions leave implicit. The purpose is to understand the operation before deciding what should change.
AeroLeadership's interpretation is that repeated workarounds should be treated as information about the interface between organizational intentions and operational reality. A rule can remain essential while its implementation becomes fragile. The critical question is whether people can comply without creating a different problem somewhere else.
What can managers learn from frontline employees?
Employees often know which steps are routinely delayed, which information arrives too late and which assumptions fail in practice. OSHA's worker participation guidance specifically recommends involving workers in defining safe work practices, analyzing tasks and revising procedures. The guidance does not claim that worker preferences automatically determine the safest process. It recognizes that the people performing work hold evidence that management may not see.
That evidence is especially important where different organizations share responsibility. OSHA's guidance on host employers and contractors explains why inconsistent procedures and poor coordination between employers can undermine protection. In such environments, an individual may comply with one organization's instructions while inadvertently conflicting with another's.
This reveals a wider issue: a procedure is not merely a document; it is an agreement about how several parts of a system will behave together. If responsibilities, resources and timing do not support that agreement, the document cannot make the underlying contradiction disappear.
What is the danger of simply demanding compliance?
Enforcement may be necessary when a known safeguard is being bypassed without justification. But enforcement alone cannot make an unworkable sequence workable. If the conditions remain unchanged, managers may see more concealed deviations, delayed work or superficial evidence of compliance. That is a plausible organizational risk, not an inevitable outcome in every workplace.
The opposite reaction—informally accepting every workaround—is equally problematic. It can weaken controls whose protective purpose is not obvious during routine operations. Good judgment requires separating the protective intent of a rule from the practical assumptions built into its execution. This is why the gap between work-as-imagined and work-as-done deserves examination rather than automatic praise or blame.
AeroLeadership's broader perspective is that reliability depends on how leadership expectations, communication, workload and safeguards fit together. The discussion of repeated organizational mistakes addresses the related problem of lessons that do not change operating conditions. Procedures are one place where the difference between a declared lesson and a functioning change becomes visible.
What should leaders conclude?
A procedure is valuable when it creates a dependable basis for action and coordination. Its existence does not prove that the organization has provided the conditions needed to follow it. Nor does observed deviation automatically justify removing it. The practical implication is to remain curious about the relationship between the documented process, the people performing it and the constraints around them.
The goal is not a workplace without rules. It is an organization in which rules, resources and actual work remain aligned as conditions change. The integrated relationship between operational behavior and organizational design is developed further in AeroLeadership's leadership and reliability program.
Sources and further reading
UK Health and Safety Executive, Introduction to Human Factors (official guidance).
UK Health and Safety Executive, Workload (official guidance).
US Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Recommended Practices: Worker Participation (official guidance).
US Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Communication and Coordination for Host Employers, Contractors, and Staffing Agencies (official guidance).
